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INSURANCE COVERAGE ISSUES IN CASES OF
CLERGY MISCONDUCT
JAMES A. SERRITELLA*
INTRODUCTION
The accusations of sexual misconduct with minors on the part of
Catholic clergy have had many ramifications. One of the ramifications
that has come center stage involves insurance. Traditionally, diocesan in-
surance has been a relatively sleepy domain involving chiefly slip and fall
cases, property and casualty questions, and only rarely, cases where there
was serious disagreement between a diocese and its insurer. That sleepy
domain has now been clearly relegated to the past.
Dioceses which experienced long term friendly relations with their in-
surers are being denied coverage for particular claims and sometimes even
drawn into litigation on coverage issues. One cannot help but ask whether
the dioceses can protect their own interests while restoring some harmony
in their relations with their insurers. The answer is predicated on develop-
ing a fuller understanding of the law governing the relation between an in-
surer and insured, and fostering modes of conduct that would put the dio-
ceses in a more advantageous position vis-a-vis their insurers. This paper
will cover an analysis of some key concepts and current developments in
the law, and include some practical suggestions.
I. INSURANCE COVERAGE GENERALLY
Before discussing insurance coverage relating to clergy misconduct
specifically, it may be useful to discuss some basic concepts relating to in-
surance coverage generally. These concepts are central to the way that the
courts have framed the issues in cases involving clergy misconduct. The
first basic concept is that insurance compensates for accidental injuries or
"fortuitous loss" -rather than intentional acts. As one court has stated,
Burke, Warren, MacKay & Serritella.
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"If a single insured is allowed to consciously control the risks covered by
the policy, a central concept of insurance is violated."' This concept ex-
plains why insurance will not cover acts of clergy misconduct either di-
rectly or through vicarious liability.
As to the insurance policies themselves, liability policies either ex-
clude coverage for conduct that is "expected or intended" or include cov-
erage for conduct that is "unexpected and unintended." A policy might
state, for instance that it provides coverage for "an accident, including
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily in-
jury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint
of the insured." 2 Thus, when courts explore whether or not a diocese
should be entitled to recover for negligent hiring or supervision, a court
will often question whether or not the conduct was expected or intended.
Again, because insurance does not compensate for intentional acts, a pol-
icy would not compensate a diocese for results expected or intended on the
part of the insured.
Another issue stemming from common policy terminology centers
around the term "occurrence." Liability policies provide coverage for
damages caused by "an occurrence" during the policy period, which is
commonly defined as "an accident or event or continuous or repeated ex-
posure to conditions." 3 The issue of how many occurrences have resulted
from a given set of facts often arises because policies may limit coverage
per-occurrence or may require deductibles or self-insured retentions to be
paid on a per-occurrence basis.
Another key concept in insurance that has come to the forefront in
clergy misconduct cases is whether coverage under a given policy is "trig-
gered." The basic test for determining whether coverage has been trig-
gered first depends on the type of policy that has been issued. Liability
policies may be written on a "claims made" basis or on an occurrence ba-
sis, as already described. For a "claims made" policy, it is the presenta-
tion of a claim by a third party that triggers the policy in effect at the time
Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 89 F.3d 1386, 1392 & n.7 (8th Cir.
1996); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mauldin, 869 F. Supp. 478, 479 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (noting
"courts afford coverage for fortuitous damages but deny coverage when damages are the natural
and probable consequences of intentional conduct") (applying Texas law).
2 Maryland Cas. Co. v. Havey, 887 F. Supp. 195, 198 (C.D. I11. 1995) (original emphasis
omitted and emphasis added). Cf Interstate Fire & Cas. Co. v. Archdiocese of Portland in Ore-
gon, 747 F. Supp. 618, 620 (D. Or. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 35 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 1994)
(reciting terms of policy defining an occurrence as "an accident or a happening or event or a
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which unexpectedly and unintentionally results in
personal injury, or damage to property during the policy period.") (emphasis added).
' See e.g., Havey, 887 F. Supp. at 198 (reciting terms of policy that covers damages be-
cause of bodily injury or property damage "caused by an occurrence").
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the claim is made.4
Under an "occurrence" policy, however, coverage commonly is trig-
gered when an injury happens during the policy period. As a general rule,
the date of the occurrence "is determined by referring to the time of in-
jury."5
Whether coverage is triggered, however, will ultimately depend upon
the specific language of the policy, as well as the court interpreting the
policy. For instance, a policy stating that coverage applies for personal
injury damages arising out of occurrences happening during the policy pe-
riod, may or may not be interpreted to require that the occurrence take
place during the policy period. One court has called such language am-
biguous and interpreted it to mean that injury must result during the policy
period.' Another court has called such language plain and found that "it is
the occurrence, rather than the damages, that must 'happen during the pol-
icy period.' "7 Thus, there is both some uncertainty in the courts' applica-
tions of triggering rules and some room for argument in determining
whether coverage under a given policy has been triggered.
With this basic foundation of some concepts that are central to insur-
ance coverage generally, I'll move on to discuss how such concepts affect
insurance coverage in cases of clergy misconduct.
II. THEORIES OF COVERAGE IN CASES OF SEXUAL ABUSE
A. Coverage for the Abuser
1. Intentional Conduct and the Inferred-Intent Rule
As to coverage for the abuser, the caselaw in this area has developed
around the central concept that insurance compensates for accidental inju-
ries rather than intentional acts. Thus, the vast majority of courts deny
abusers a defense or coverage in cases of sexual abuse of minors. The
' See Graman v. Continental Cas. Co., 409 N.E.2d 387, 390 (I11. App. Ct. 1980) ("It is
well-established that the 'claims made' or 'discovery' policy is characterized by coverage for
negligent acts or omissions only if such are discovered during and brought to the attention of the
insurer within the policy term.").
' Michigan Chem. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 728 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir.
1984); see also Milbank Ins. Co. v. J.T., No. C7-96-1225, 1997 WL 10525, at *2 (Minn. Ct.
App. Jan. 14, 1997) (while the injury must take place during the policy period, "[t]here is no
requirement that the negligent act or accident causing the injury also occur during the policy
period").
6 See Eagle-Picher Indus. Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 24 (1st Cir. 1982),
cert. denied sub nom., Froude v. Eagle-Picher Indus. Inc., 460 U.S. 1028 (1983).
7 Archdiocese of Portland, 35 F.3d at 1329 (emphasis added).
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courts have developed what has become known as the inferred-intent rule.
Under the inferred-intent rule, an abuser's intent to injure his victims will
be found as a matter of law. Thus, an insurer will have no duty to defend
or indemnify someone who engaged in sexual abuse because the inferred
intentional bodily harm will fall outside the coverage of the insurance
policy.8
The inferred-intent rule stems from public policy considerations rec-
ognizing the "inherently injurious" nature of sexual abuse. One court has
stated that "the alleged sexual contact is so substantially certain to result in
some injury, or so inherently injurious, 'that the act is considered a crimi-
nal offense for which public policy precludes a claim of unintended conse-
quences, that is, a claim that no harm was intended to result from the
act."' 9 Ohio's Supreme Court has determined that there is no need to even
look to the "intentional acts exclusion" of a policy and has applied the in-
ferred-intent rule to conclude that "[t]he public policy of the state of Ohio
precludes issuance of insurance to provide liability coverage for injuries
produced by criminal acts of sexual misconduct against a minor." 0
While courts infer an abuser's intent, and thus typically deny even a
duty to defend, a policy provision may be worded in such a way as to re-
quire an insurer to defend an abuser for alleged intentional conduct even if
there is no duty to indemnify. Such was the case in Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Vonnahmen," where the Seventh Circuit found no duty to indem-
nify, but a duty to defend based on a policy provision which stated that the
insured was protected under the policy for claims alleging sexual behavior
"unless a judgment or a final adjudication adverse to the insured shall es-
tablish that such behavior occurred as an essential element of the cause of
action so adjudicated." " Such provisions, however, appear to be the ex-
ception rather than the rule. However, in jurisdictions where the issue has
not been squarely decided, even without such a provision, courts may find
a duty to defend based on judicial ruling that an insurer's duty to defend is
broader than the duty to indemnify. Therefore, if a complaint alleges some
theory that would trigger the policy, a duty to defend may arise.
2. Negligent Conduct
Because the inferred-intent rule precludes coverage for acts of abuse,
See Havey, 887 F. Supp. at 199-200.
9 Whitt v. DeLeu, 707 F. Supp. 1011, 1014-15 (W.D. Wis. 1989) (quoting Horace Mann
Ins. Co. v. Leeber, 376 S.E.2d 581, 585 (W. Va. 1988)); see also id. at n.4 (naming cases from
fourteen states which have inferred intent).
'0 Gearing v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 665 N.E.2d 1115, 1120 (Ohio 1996).
" 102 F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 1997).
12 Id. at 278 (emphasis omitted).
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some have sought to bring their claims within policy coverage by alleging
"negligent abuse." Again, because acts of sexual abuse are viewed as in-
tentional and inherently injurious, courts typically reject allegations of
negligence against an abuser as "transparent attempt[s] to trigger insur-
ance coverage." 3 One court, for instance, found no duty to defend or in-
demnify because a claim of "negligent failure to seek or obtain treatment
for pedophilia" was not independent of the alleged intentional acts of sex-
ual molestation. 4
As the language of this court suggests, however, a duty to defend may
be found if a complaint alleges negligent acts that are independent or dis-
tinct from the sexual abuse alleged. One court has found a duty to defend
where an issue of fact existed as to whether allegations of public embar-
rassment were separate and apart from allegations of sexual molestation. "
Although the law in this area is fairly well-settled, a decision from a
federal district court in Alabama has found a duty to defend a claim for
negligent touching which was subsequently added to a complaint alleging
intentional acts of exposure and contact and various other intentional
torts. 6 Furthermore, a federal district court in Pennsylvania has found a
duty to defend where a complaint alleged that the insureds' minor daughter
sexually molested a child at the insureds' day care center. 7 While the
complaint alleged both intentional and negligent acts against the daughter,
it is unclear from the facts of the opinion if this is an instance of a duty to
defend "negligent" acts of abuse or if this falls within a long line of cases
finding a duty to defend for acts of negligence, separate and apart from the
alleged abuse.
Still, despite any aberrations, the rule remains that insurance will not
compensate for intentional acts of abuse. As a result, the search for negli-
gent acts-and insurance coverage-has led to those who hire and super-
vise the clergy involved. This search has brought the issue to the door-
steps of the dioceses.
" Havey, 887 F. Supp. at 200-01 (holding that an allegation of negligence could not "be
separated from [the abuser's] alleged acts of intentional sexual assault"); see also id. at 201
(stating that no claim existed for negligent breach of the duty between clergy and their congre-
gation, because Illinois had not recognized such a duty).
'4 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mauldin, 869 F. Supp. 478,480 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
IS See Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B., 846 P.2d 792, 797 (Cal. 1993); see also Snyder
v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 688 F. Supp. 932, 938 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (duty to defend where
complaint alleged "separate and distinct acts of medical malpractice" because genuine issues
existed as to whether these acts were committed in addition to alleged acts of sexual abuse).
16 See Sentry Ins. Co. v. Miller, 914 F. Supp. 496 (M.D. Ala. 1996), rev'd in part, 114 F.3d
1202 (11 th Cir. 1997).
" See Nationwide Mut. Fire Co. v. Shank, 951 F. Supp. 68, 71 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
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B. Coverage for the Dioceses
1. Negligent Hiring and Supervision
While an abuser's intent to injure will be inferred, those who hire and
supervise the alleged abuser-typically his Diocese-may be entitled to a
defense and coverage for allegations of negligent hiring and supervision.
Some courts find that "a refusal to distinguish between the abuser's inten-
tional conduct and the employer's alleged negligence in hiring the abuser
ignores the clear language... [of a policy that] excludes bodily injury or
property damage expected or intended from the standpoint of the in-
sured." 18
In cases of negligence, however, one word can sometimes make the
difference as to whether coverage will be found. If an intentional act ex-
clusion provision precludes coverage when "an insured" -rather than
"the insured" -intentionally causes an injury, claims based on a third
party's negligence are commonly excluded. 9
As explained by James K. Kloss and Carl F. Mariano:
If the intentional act exclusion refers to the acts of "the insured," courts
have uniformly considered the insurer's obligations to several insureds to
be severable rather than joint; that is, there are separate contracts with
each of the insureds. The result is that an excluded act of one insured
does not bar coverage for other insureds who have not engaged in the ex-
cluded conduct. If the policy excludes coverage for intentional acts of
"an insured," however, the courts have held that the intentional act of
any insured bars coverage for all insureds.2°
Such a result demonstrates the importance of being aware of the spe-
cific language of your policy-and how the courts have interpreted such
language.
Still, the conduct of a diocese in hiring and supervising an alleged
abuser potentially falls within the coverage of some insurance policies.
And in this context, another of the general concepts of insurance coverage
becomes relevant-the concept of "expected or intended" conduct. As I
"S United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Open Sesame Child Care Ctrs., 819 F. Supp. 756,
760 (N.D. Il1. 1993);. see also Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 858 F. Supp.
1407, 1415 (D. Minn. 1994), rev'd in part on other grounds, 89 F.3d 1386 (8th Cir. 1996) (dis-
cussing same with respect to negligent supervision claim).
19 See, e.g., Johnson v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. Civ. 95-151-P-H, 1996 WL 66231, at *2 (D.
Me. 1996) (holding that policy language that excluded "coverage for ... [damages] 'intention-
ally caused by an insured person' " precluded coverage for damages resulting from one in-
sured's negligent acts because they were the same damages caused by the insured abuser's acts).
29 James K. Kloss & Carl F. Mariano, Insurance Coverage in Sexual Misconduct Cases, 42
FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 191, 202 (1992).
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stated earlier, liability policies either exclude coverage for conduct that is
expected or intended or include coverage for conduct that is unexpected
and unintended. The issue here becomes where to draw the line between
negligence and that which is expected.
2. Expected or Intended Conduct
Retaining an abuser after being informed of allegations of sexual mis-
conduct and after a psychological evaluation of the abuser is sought may
not preclude insurance coverage for a claim of negligence stemming from
subsequent acts of abuse. One court has stated that such knowledge "does
not necessarily ascribe to the Diocese the requisite expectation and intent
to transform its retention of... [the abuser] from ordinary negligence into
gross or willful negligence-which transformation might exclude the ac-
tions of the Diocese from 'occurrence' coverage under the general liability
section of the policy." 2'
At some point, however, a supervisor's action in keeping an abuser in
a position to abuse will rise to the level of conduct that is expected or in-
tended, and will fall outside the coverage of the policy. When examining
whether a supervisor "expected" the victim of the abuse to be harmed, one
court framed the issue as "whether a reasonably prudent person in the po-
sition of the Diocese and the Archdiocese knew or should have known that
[the abuse] ... was substantially probable as a result of the continuing ex-
posure caused by their willful indifference." 
22
The issue is analyzed on a continuum. In other words, "[t]he differ-
ence between damages that are reasonably foreseeable and damages that
are substantially probable is one of degree of expectability." 23 The Eighth
Circuit in Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co. 24 offered an
example to explain this idea: "[I]f an insured is alerted to a problem, its
cause, and knows or should have known of the likelihood of the problem's
reoccurrence, it cannot ignore such problem and then look to its insurer to
reimburse it for the liability incurred by reason of such inaction."25
While in some circumstances it may be difficult to decipher if con-
duct has reached the "substantially probable" point on the expectability
continuum, the court in this case did not believe it was faced with such a
problem. The court held that there was "overwhelming evidence" that the
2' Lutheran Benevolent Ins. Co. v. National Catholic Risk Retention Group, Inc., 939 F.
Supp. 1506, 1512 (N.D. Okla. 1995).
22 Winona, 89 F.3d at 1391.
2 Id. at 1392.
24 89 F.3d 1386 (8th Cir. 1996).
2 Id. at 1392.
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Diocese knew or should have known it was highly likely that the abuse
would recur: the Diocese (i) knew that for years the priest had been abus-
ing children in every parish in which he had served and (ii) knew that
treatment was ineffective. Still, the Diocese allowed the priest to be
placed in situations in which he could continue to abuse.26 Because further
abuse was expected under such circumstances, coverage was denied. The
court reached a similar conclusion with respect to the Archdiocese, but al-
lowed coverage for a brief period after the Archdiocese first learned of the
abuse.27 Thus, while some conduct may clearly be at the extremes of the
continuum, there are no bright line rules for determining whether many
scenarios constitute conduct that is "expected or intended" or "unex-
pected and unintended."
In addition to being aware of the basic theories of coverage applicable
to clergy who engage in misconduct and the dioceses that assign and su-
pervise such clergy, it is useful to be aware of potential policy provisions
which can affect the insurance coverage available to a diocese. Such pro-
visions include those that exclude sexual misconduct, those that limit the
coverage available in cases of sexual misconduct, and those that define the
type of injury covered by a policy.
C. Exclusions from Coverage
First, some policies expressly exclude coverage for claims "arising
out of" abuse or molestation.28 While such a policy provision will, of
course, preclude any coverage for clergy committing misconduct, claims
for negligent hiring, supervision or retention of the abuser are also com-
monly excluded as "arising from" the act of abuse.29 Such negligence
claims are excluded as arising out of the abuse because the sexual abuse
constitutes an essential element of such claims.30
26 See id. at 1394.
27 See id. at 1395-96.
28 See, e.g., McAuliffe v. Northern Ins. Co. of N.Y., 69 F.3d 277, 279 (8th Cir. 1995) (af-
firming district court's decision that the abuse and molestation exclusion precluded coverage for
claims of tortious conduct against priest and claim of negligent supervision against Bishop);
Hough v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 481 N.W.2d 393, 397-98 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (finding
no duty to defend because sexual abuse exclusion precluded claims of negligent counseling
which were based on sexual relationship between pastor and parishioner).
29 See, e.g., IPCI Ltd. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 758 F. Supp. 478, 480 (E.D. Wis. 1991)
(sexual abuse exclusion precluded coverage for claims of negligent supervision against nursing
facility where patient was sexually abused).
30 See All Am. Ins. Co. v. Bums, 971 F.2d 438, 442 (10th Cir. 1992) (sexual molestation by
volunteer bus driver was an essential element of negligence claims against church and its direc-
tors).
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D. Limitations on Coverage
While some policies may exclude coverage for claims arising out of
abuse or molestation, other policies may simply set lower limits of cover-
age for claims involving sexual misconduct. One such "Sexual Miscon-
duct" provision included a cap on liability for psychotherapists at $25,000
for " 'all claims against any Insured(s) involving any actual or alleged
erotic physical contact, or attempt thereat [sic] or proposal thereof' by the
insured with his or her former or current patient."'" The cap also applied
to other claims of misconduct arising out of the same professional relation-
ship if sexual misconduct was alleged.32
While the Seventh Circuit rejected arguments that such a provision
violated public policy,33 the Ninth Circuit has affirmed a decision finding
the provision void as against public policy to the extent that it caps liability
on non-sexual misconduct claims when sexual misconduct claims are also
involved.34
E. Types of Injuries Covered
In addition to policy provisions which exclude or limit coverage for
sexual misconduct, a diocese should be aware that the type of injury that a
policy actually covers will also be narrowly defined. When a policy cov-
ers damages resulting from "bodily injury," courts commonly require ac-
tual physical injury, rather than mental or emotional injury." Thus, a
complaint alleging solely humiliation or embarrassment and no physical
injury may not even bring the claim within the coverage of the policy.
However, in Servants of the Paraclete, Inc. v. Great American Insur-
ance Co.,36 the court stated that psychological and emotional injuries such
as depression, anxiety, poor self-esteem, and self-destructive behavior may
constitute "sickness" under a policy defining bodily injury as "bodily in-
3' American Home Assurance Co. v. Stone, 61 F.3d 1321, 1323 (7th Cir. 1995).
32 See id.
31 Id. at 1328 (noting that the provision was approved by the Illinois Department of Insur-
ance).
31 See American Home Assurance Co. v. Cohen, 815 F. Supp. 365, 370-71 (W.D. Wash.
1993) affd mem., 67 F.3d 305 (9th Cir. 1995). For a general discussion of public policy issues
involved with insuring the clergy, see Janice D. Villiers, Clergy Malpractice Revisited: Liability
for Sexual Misconduct in the Counseling Relationship, 74 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1, 22-29 (1996).
31 See e.g., Kline v. Kemper Group, 826 F. Supp. 123, 129 (M.D. Pa. 1993) aff'd mem., 22
F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 1994) ("The Pennsylvania courts have soundly rejected the contention that
policy definitions of injury or bodily injury encompass mental or emotional harm.") (citing
Jackson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 606 A.2d 1384 (Pa. 1992); Lapeka, Inc. v. Security Nat'l Ins. Co.,
Inc., 814 F. Supp. 1540, 1548-49 (D. Kan. 1993) (finding claims for pain, humiliation, and em-
barrassment outside the definition of "bodily injury" covered by policy).
36 857 F. Supp. 822, 834, modified on other grounds, 866 F. Supp. 1560 (D.N.M. 1994).
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jury, sickness or disease." Finally, it has also been held that a policy pro-
vided coverage for current bodily injuries which resulted from abuse that
had taken place years before. 7 These cases demonstrate the importance of
a policyholder's awareness of the specific provisions contained in the pol-
icy as they relate to a claim arising from clergy misconduct. Moreover,
one must keep in mind the importance of knowing how the relevant juris-
diction has interpreted such provisions.
III. THE NUMBER OF POLICIES TRIGGERED AND THE NUMBER OF
OCCURRENCES
In addition to the basic theories of coverage, the issues of (i) the
number of policies triggered and (ii) the number of occurrences involved
in a given case have received a great deal of attention in the area of sexual
misconduct. A brief analysis of the practical concerns at issue will facili-
tate a discussion of the cases focusing on these concepts.
A. The Issues
Cases of sexual misconduct frequently involve multiple acts of abuse
spanning several years and several policy terms. Thus, courts must deter-
mine how many separate policy terms and how many "occurrences" are
implicated.
The number of policies triggered can significantly affect the financial
burdens in a given case. If only the policy in effect at the time of the first
act of abuse is called on to respond for the damages, the insured and the
primary insurer will generally fare better-assuming there is sufficient ex-
cess coverage available. In such a scenario, the excess insurer will likely
be responsible for a large portion of the damages once the deductible is
paid and the primary insurance is exhausted. However, if several policies
are made to respond, the insured and the primary insurer may be responsi-
ble for any deductibles and coverage limits in each triggered policy period.
In this situation, the limits of the primary coverage in each policy term
may not be exhausted, and thus leave the excess insurer with no financial
responsibility whatsoever.
The number of occurrences determined also bears on the financial re-
sponsibilities of the parties. A policy may set limits on a per-occurrence
basis or may require the insured to pay a deductible or self-insured reten-
tion for each occurrence. It is typically in the interest of the excess insurer
31 See Milbank Ins. Co. v. J.T., No. C7-96-1225, 1997 WL 10525 (Minn. App. Ct. Jan. 14,
1997) (finding that the time of" occurrence" is not necessarily when the act was committed, but
rather when the individual was actually damaged).
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that several occurrences are found so that the insured is responsible for
several deductibles.
Although whether a policy is triggered and the number of occurrences
that result from a given set of facts are two separate concepts, the courts
sometimes blur the issues, making it difficult to decipher the precise views
of the court on either front. Still, a discussion of some of the cases in-
volving these issues is useful as these issues have extreme consequences as
to the financial responsibility of the dioceses.
B. The First Encounter Rule
I will begin by discussing the First Encounter Rule. As the name
suggests, under the First Encounter Rule the policy in effect at the time of
the first act of abuse provides coverage for all damages resulting from the
abuse. This is so despite the fact that the acts of abuse may span several
years and several policy terms. This position was advocated primarily by
Lloyd's, which typically issues first layer policies to dioceses. This posi-
tion may also be beneficial to dioceses, depending on the situation.
The court in Interstate Fire & Casualty Co. v. Archdiocese of Port-
land in Oregon3" applied what has become known as the "first encounter
rule" to determine which policies had been triggered. Before discussing
the triggering issue, however, the court examined the number of occur-
rences implicated in the case.
Applying the "cause theory," the court examined whether the negli-
gent supervision and failure to remove arising from sexual abuse that had
spanned almost four years and four policies constituted more than one oc-
currence. Under the cause theory, the issue is "whether there was one
proximate, uninterrupted and continuing cause which resulted in all of the
injuries and damage for which the claimant seeks coverage."39 The court
concluded that the Archdiocese's act in hiring and failing to properly su-
pervise or remove the abuser, although "present in each of the policy years
at issue" resulted in one continuous act of negligence.4° This continuous
act of negligence constituted the "single proximate cause" resulting in the
child's injury and was thus a "single occurrence" under the terms of the
policies at issue.4'
As to whether coverage under a given policy had been triggered, the
court determined that the injury resulting from the occurrence had to take
38 747 F. Supp. 618 (D. Or. 1990), rev'd, 35 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 1994).
39 Id. at 622-23.
40 Id. at 625.
41 Id.
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place during the policy term.42 Because the parties agreed that the injury
had taken place at the time the child was first molested, the court deter-
mined that only the policy in effect at the time of this "first encounter"
provided coverage.43
Following the decision in Archdiocese of Portland, other courts
adopted its reasoning. The court in Lee v. Interstate Fire & Casualty
Co.,' for instance, concluded that although the abuse in that case spanned
two policy periods, the continuous abuse by the priest and the continuous
negligence of the Diocese "were the cause of [the child's] injuries and thus
constitute[d] one occurrence."45 As a result of the decision in Lee, the in-
sured and the primary insurer were only responsible for one self-insured
retention or deductible.
Subsequent history of the district court decision in Lee provides a
good example of how a state's law on allocation of liability among insur-
ers may affect an outcome in a practical sense. On a motion for reconsid-
eration, Interstate argued that Illinois law should have applied and would
have required the primary insurer to pay two deductibles, one for each
policy period during which the child was injured.' While maintaining that
Illinois law did not apply to the case, the court determined that even under
Illinois law, Interstate would have only been entitled to one deductible.
The court reasoned that Illinois law provided for joint and several liability
among insurers whose policies had been triggered, but did not necessarily
require a deductible to be paid for each of the multiple policies triggered.
Rather, if an insured only looked to one of the policies to cover the dam-
ages, only one deductible would apply.47 Thus, as a practical matter, the
outcome of the case would not be affected.
C. Rejection of the First Encounter Rule
As federal district court decisions applying the first encounter rule
have reached the circuit courts, some circuit courts have specifically re-
jected the rule. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits, for instance, have each re-
versed decisions applying the first encounter rule, finding an occurrence in
each policy term in which a victim is abused. The result of the courts' de-
cisions is that multiple policies are triggered, rather than just the policy in
effect at the time of the first encounter. The Fifth and Ninth Circuit's de-
42 See id.
41 See id. (rejecting insurance provider's claim for reimbursement).
4 826 F. Supp. 1156 (N.D. 111. 1993), rev'd, 86 F.3d 101 (7th Cir. 1996).
4' Id. at 1163.
' See Lee v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., No. 91-C-1732, 1993 WL 558741, *1 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 6, 1994).
47 See id. at *2.
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cisions have focused on the language of the policies at issue as well as the
number of victims and policy terms implicated in each case.
1. The Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit, in Society of the Roman Catholic Church of the
Diocese of Lafayette and Lake Charles, Inc. v. Interstate Fire & Casualty
Co.,48 specifically rejected the first encounter rule for three reasons: (i) the
court reasoned that the rule ignored the fact that the policies excluded cov-
erage for bodily injury occurring outside of the policy period; (ii) the court
believed, on the facts of the case, that the rule "would prevent insurance
companies from limiting their coverage to damages emanating from mo-
lestations taking place during their policy period" ;49 and (iii) the court
found the rule inequitable in that it would exclude from coverage one who
had been abused just before the Diocese obtained coverage, but who con-
tinued to be abused during the policy period.5"
The court applied the "exposure rule" to determine that each initial
act of abuse during a new policy term constituted an occurrence triggering
coverage. The court stated:
When a priest molested a child during a policy year, there was both bod-
ily injury and an occurrence, triggering policy coverage. All further mo-
lestations of that child during the policy period arose out of the same oc-
currence. When the priest molested the same child during the succeeding
policy year, again there was both bodily injury and an occurrence. Thus,
each child suffered an "occurrence" in each policy period in which he
was molested. t
The effect of the court's analysis was that multiple policies, rather
than one policy, provided coverage for the damages stemming from years
of abuse.
In addition to finding that there was an occurrence in each policy pe-
riod in which a child was molested, the court determined that the damage
to each of the thirty-one children who had been abused constituted a sepa-
rate occurrence.52 A district court in New York, on the other hand, has
found that there was only one occurrence per policy period for a group of
children who suffered "exposure to conditions of sexual abuse."53
41 26 F.3d 1359 (5th Cir. 1994).
49 Id. at 1366.
so See id.
"' Id. at 1365.
51 See id. at 1364.
53 Safeguard Ins. Co. v. Angel Guardian Home, 946 F. Supp. 221, 231 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)
(insured in this case was an agency providing placement services for foster children).
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2. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit, in Interstate Fire & Casualty Co. v. Archdiocese of
Portland in Oregon,54 reversed the district court decision, finding only one
occurrence and only one policy triggered. The court held that there had
been four occurrences--one in each policy period. The court stated:
[B]ecause each policy covers only damages stemming from [the child's]
exposure to the [priest] occurring during the policy period, and because
the parties do not contest that [the child] was exposed to the negligently
supervised priest in each of the four policy periods, we conclude that [the]
claim implicates four occurrences."
Specifically, the court found that based on the policy definition of oc-
currence, "the repeated 'exposure' of the boy to the negligently supervised
priest," rather than the negligent supervision alone, resulted in injury 6
Furthermore, the court found it significant that the policy only covered in-
juries arising from occurrences "happening during the period of insur-
ance."5 7 Thus, although the injuries all stemmed from the same general
conditions, based on the facts of the case, the boy's "exposure to the neg-
ligently supervised priest in each of the four different policy periods con-
stituted a separate occurrence." 58
As in the Fifth Circuit decision, the effect of the court's analysis was
that multiple policies provided coverage, rather than just the policy in ef-
fect at the time of the first encounter.
3. The Seventh Circuit's Fact Specific Approach
A recent decision in the Seventh Circuit, although involving a district
court decision applying the first encounter rule, takes a different approach
than that of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits. The Seventh Circuit opinion sug-
gests that decisions concerning the number of occurrences should be tied
to the specific facts surrounding the negligence at issue in a given case.
In Lee v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 9 the Seventh Circuit re-
versed the district court's determination that the Diocese's continuous
negligent supervision, spanning two policy periods, constituted one occur-
rence. Applying Rhode Island law, the court declined to follow what it
deemed the Fifth and Ninth Circuits' assumption: that "every child abuse
m 35 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 1994).
5S Id. at 1331.
56 Id. at 1329.
57 Id.
59 Id. at 1330; see also Roman Catholic Diocese of Lafayette v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co.,
26 F.3d 1359, 1363-64 (5th Cir. 1994) (reaching a similar conclusion on almost identical facts).
39 86 F.3d 101 (7th Cir. 1996).
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case produces either one 'occurrence' or many, according to the number of
victims and policy years involved." o
Rather, the court determined that whether there was one or multiple
occurrences was tied to the specific facts concerning the negligence al-
leged in each case. The court offered this example:
If as in the Portland case a diocese receives multiple warnings about a
priest's misconduct and ignores all of them, it would be appropriate to
call those lapses multiple occurrences-for intervention after any one of
them could have avoided some of the injury. But if instead the diocese
receives no danger signals, and its negligence lies in failure to investigate
on its own (if that is negligence at all), or if the diocese intervenes but
takes action that in retrospect is inadequate, then the lapse looks more like
a single occurrence under the policy's definition.
61
Because the party bearing the burden of persuasion and production in
Lee had not informed the court of the specific facts concerning the negli-
gent supervision in the case, and "[b]ecause Rhode Island would not
[have] treat[ed] negligent supervision as invariably one 'occurrence,' " the
court reversed the district court's determination.62
It is not yet clear how these alternatives to the first encounter rule will
fare over time, either in the misconduct area or in other areas.
D. Self-Insured Retentions
As with the number of policies triggered and the number of occur-
rences, courts' decisions concerning the responsibility for self-insured re-
tentions in each triggered policy period can significantly alter the parties'
financial responsibilities for damages. Suppose a case involving five years
of abuse is settled for $500,000 and that the Diocese has five one-year
policies, each with a $100,000 self-insured retention. The court's decision
on this issue will determine whether the Diocese is responsible for 1/5 of
the claim or the entire claim.
Under the current trend, the Diocese in this scenario would be respon-
sible for the entire claim. In Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Casu-
alty Co.,63 for instance, the court held that the insured churches were re-
sponsible for the self-insured retention for "each of the triggered
policies." 6 Although the court previously had determined that the
60 Id. at 104 (construing Roman Catholic Diocese of Lafayette, 26 F.3d at 1359, and Inter-
state Fire & Cas. Co. v. Archdiocese of Portland, 35 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 1994)).
61 Id. at 104-05.
62 Id. at 105 (emphasis in original).
6 916 F. Supp. 923 (D. Minn. 1995), modified, 89 F.3d 1386 (8th Cir. 1996).
6See id. at 929.
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churches were liable only for a single, weighted self-insured retention, it
changed its decision in light of an intervening decision of the Minnesota
Supreme Court.65 The court in Winona concluded that its case was "factu-
ally indistinguishable" " from the state court case, stating:
Each litigation involved indemnification under [comprehensive general
liability] policies that contained a layer of self-insurance (the SIR) for
which the insured was responsible. Each involved injuries incurred over
an extended period of time, a period during which the insured was cov-
ered by a number of distinct insuring agreements. And, each involved
damages that could not rationally be allocated to specific policy periods
in which the damages actually occurred.67
The Ninth Circuit has rejected a public policy argument concerning
the payment of a self-insured retention for every triggered policy. In In-
terstate Fire & Casualty Co. v. Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon, the
Archdiocese argued that a finding that abuse constituted more than one oc-
currence would be contrary to public policy because "such a finding would
require the Archdiocese to pay more than one [self-insured retention]." 6'
The court in Portland did not reach the issue of how damages should be
apportioned among the four insurance policies triggered in the case, but
still rejected the argument: although the Archdiocese may have to bear a
significant burden of the settlement, such a result was "dictated by the
terms of the policies the Archdiocese purchased." 69
Thus, for a diocese to understand the extent of its potential liability, it
is necessary to understand the courts' interpretations of these issues con-
cerning triggering, occurrences, and self-insured retentions. The first en-
counter rule is at least fairly clear and certain in its applications. The al-
ternatives appear neither clear, nor certain. To avoid this ambiguity and its
possible adverse consequences, I suggest that dioceses seek broad com-
pensating insurance contract provisions such as larger aggregate coverage
limits.
IV. COVERAGE LITIGATION
Having discussed the specific issues that frequently arise in cases in-
volving clergy misconduct, I would like to return to some general concerns
involving issues of coverage litigation that arise when insurers have im-
. Id. at 926 (relying upon Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 523
N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1994), which involved continuous environmental contamination).
6Id. at 928.
67 Id.
68 Archdiocese of Portland, 35 F.3d at 1331.
69 Id.
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properly refused to defend or provide coverage. While it is, of course, in
all parties' interests to avoid such disputes, the dioceses must be aware of
such possibilities in order to fully protect their rights under their policies.
A. Bases for Actions Against Insurers
Actions against insurers may be based on theories of breach of con-
tract, wrongful failure to settle, or bad faith in refusing to defend or pro-
vide coverage. Each cause of action carries its respective burden of proof.
Also highly relevant, of course, are the types of damages available to a
diocese should it pursue and succeed in an action.
1. Breach of Contract
Under a theory of breach of contract in a coverage trial, the policy-
holder bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case." This can be
done by proving that the claims fall within the operative language of the
policy, namely, that the claims fall within the policy period, the identity of
the insured, and the definitions of occurrence and bodily injury. Once a
prima facie case of coverage has been made, the insurer bears the burden
of proving the applicability of exclusions.7 Such exclusions might include
an intentional acts exclusion or a provision that specifically excludes acts
arising out of claims of sexual abuse. Some courts impose heightened
standards on an insurer attempting to prove that an exclusion applies.
In a breach of contract action, the damages awarded are intended to
make the policyholder whole - what the policy would have paid had the
claim not been denied. When an insurer unjustly refuses to defend, an in-
sured is entitled to recover the reasonable costs and attorneys' fees that the
insured expended in its defense.72 Furthermore, an insured may be able to
recover consequential damages. Such damages may be recovered, for ex-
ample, for damage to an insured's credit rating or interest on a loan needed
to pay for defending the suit.73
If a policyholder can prove that the insurer breached its contractual
duty to defend the policyholder against a third party's claim, then in a mi-
nority of jurisdictions most notably in Illinois the court would hold that the
insurance company is estopped to deny coverage.74 The rationale is that if
70 See ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS & DISPUTES, § 9.01 (3d ed. 1995).
7 See St. Michael's Orthodox Catholic Church v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 496 N.E.2d
1176, 1178 (Ill. App. Ct.1986).
72 See WINDT, supra note 70, at § 4.33.
73 See id. at § 4.34.
74 See Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 1212, 1214 (7th Cir. 1994) (ap-
plying Illinois law in holding that insurer was estopped in denying coverage because it breached
its duty to defend).
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the insurer breached its contract, the insurer should not be allowed to in-
voke its terms.
2. Failure to Settle
In a failure to settle a case, the policyholder has the burden of proving
that the claim was potentially within coverage and may have the burden of
proving that there was an opportunity to settle.75 Furthermore, if a policy-
holder wants to recover consequential damages, the policyholder may have
to prove that it was possible to settle within the policy limits.76 If the poli-
cyholder settles the claim after the insurer denies coverage, the policy-
holder may have the burden of proving that the amount of the settlement is
reasonable." Finally, if the policyholder seeks to recover the full amount
of a judgment, the policyholder may have the burden of proving bad faith
on the part of the insurer.78
In the failure to settle context, where the policyholder's liability is
reasonably clear, and the insurer nevertheless rejects an opportunity to set-
tle the claim within its policy limits, the insurer can be liable for the full
amount of any subsequent judgment rendered against the policyholder.
Some jurisdictions, however, require the policyholder to demonstrate that
the insurer acted in bad faith before such damages will be imposed.79 One
court has articulated the bad faith standard as the "furtherance of the in-
surer's interest with intentional disregard of the financial interest of the in-
sured." 80
3. Bad Faith
As for a bad faith action, the policyholder bears the burden of proving
that the insurer's denial of coverage was so clearly unsupported by the
relevant facts or policy language as to amount to a reckless breach of duty
to the policyholder.
Furthermore, when the insurer has acted in bad faith, in many states it
is possible to recover punitive damages. To warrant such an award, the in-
surer's conduct must be "tantamount to malice, oppression, or fraud" " or
73 See WINDT, supra note 70, at § 5.02.
'6 See id. (citing National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Continental Ill. Corp., 673 F. Supp. 267,
273 (N.D. Ill. 1987)).
7 See id. (citing Hodges v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 488 F. Supp. 1057, 1063 (D.S.C.
1980)).
71 See id.
'9 See id. at §5.12.
80 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Floyd, 366 S.E.2d 93, 97 (Va. 1988).
81 See WINDT, supra note 70, at § 9.26 (citing First Marine Ins. Co. v. Booth, 876 S.W.2d
255, 257 (Ark. 1994)).
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in "conscious disregard of the insured's rights." 2 In Illinois, however,
some question exists as to whether such damages are recoverable: section
155 of the Insurance Code puts a $25,000 cap on penalties against an in-
surer for a "vexatious and unreasonable" delay in paying a claim. 3
B. Defensive Strategies
While a diocese may initiate a coverage action, it may also find itself
defending an action in which an insurer seeks a declaration as to its duties
under a given policy. Thus, I will briefly discuss some possible defensive
strategies which, subject to state law, a diocese might consider should it
find itself on the other end of coverage litigation.
If an insurer brings a declaratory judgment action to determine
whether it has a duty to defend and a duty to indemnify, a court may be
willing to stay the action as to the duty to indemnify. The court in Na-
tionwide Mutual Fire Co. v. Shank, 4 for example, exercised its discretion
to stay a determination on the issue of coverage pending the determination
of facts in the underlying state court action. Relying in part on the Third
Circuit's decision in Terra Nova Insurance Co. Ltd. v. 900 Bar, Inc.," the
court in Shank expressed its concern that the parties would be collaterally
estopped on issues in the underlying action if it ruled on the duty to in-
demnify because the issue of intent was central to both actions. The court
concluded that it should stay its decision on the issue of coverage to avoid
prejudicing the parties in the underlying action. 6
Thus, if a diocese which has a duty to defend policy is faced with an
insurer's declaratory judgment action on a duty to defend and a duty to in-
demnify, it should seek to have the action stayed as to the duty to indem-
nify pending the outcome of the underlying action. This will preserve any
duty to defend that the insurer is determined to have and will avoid preju-
dice to the diocese in the underlying action due to the possible collateral
estoppel effect of any determination in the coverage action regarding
whether the diocese's conduct was expected or intended.
By this same logic, if a diocese has a duty to indemnify policy which
reimburses damages and defense costs as elements of ultimate net loss, ar-
guably, a declaratory judgment prior to the termination of the underlying
action is always premature, due to the concerns regarding collateral estop-
82 Id. (citing Aetna Cas. and Surety Co. v. Joseph, 769 S.W.2d 603, 607 (Tex. Ct. App.
1989)).
"' ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 215, § 155 (West 1993).
84 951 F. Supp. 68 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 127 F.3d 1096 (3d Cir. 1997).
5 887 F.2d 1213 (3d Cir. 1989).
See Shank, 951 F. Supp. at 72-73.
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pel just mentioned.
V. PURCHASING INSURANCE
Just as being informed about applicable policy provisions in the midst
of litigation is important, when looking to purchase insurance it is essential
to be informed about the array of provisions that may be included in a
policy.
As demonstrated earlier, policy language and courts' interpretations
of such language will ultimately determine whether a diocese is left to pay
a small portion of any damages or the entire claim. Thus, a diocese should
be aware of these potential policy provisions and considerations bearing on
the purchase of insurance. While the list I will provide is nonexhaustive, it
highlights many of the important issues already mentioned, and includes
some other tips central to purchasing insurance.
When purchasing insurance, first and foremost, a diocese should be
certain that it is dealing with a knowledgeable broker who is sensitive to
its special needs and committed to providing it with first rate service.
Furthermore, the broker should have sufficient contacts to provide a dio-
cese with the best possible deal. Initially and from time to time afterward,
a diocese should put its book of business up for bids.
A. Intentional Act Exclusions
As to specific policy provisions, a diocese should be aware of the
wording of the Intentional Act Exclusion of a given policy. Coverage will
typically be provided if the exclusion concerns intentional acts of "the in-
sured" rather than "an insured" or "any insured."87
B. Sexual Misconduct Exclusions
Next, a policy may contain a sexual misconduct exclusion. Under
such a provision, coverage is typically excluded as arising from sexual
misconduct. As stated earlier, claims against a diocese for negligent hiring
or supervision are commonly excluded under such provisions because the
sexual abuse constitutes an essential element of such claims.88
C. Duty to Defend Provisions
While it is of course desirable to avoid sexual misconduct exclusions,
an insured may not be able to avoid provisions concerning sexual miscon-
duct altogether. A diocese may consider negotiating for a provision pro-
"' See discussion supra Part II.C.
88 See id.
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viding a duty to defend up until the time that a judgment or final adjudica-
tion is reached concerning a claim for which the sexual misconduct is an
essential element.89
D. Sexual Misconduct Caps
A diocese's insurance coverage could also be significantly affected by
a sexual misconduct cap provision. Such a provision may cap at a certain
dollar amount claims involving sexual misconduct. Furthermore, coverage
may be capped for claims involving non-sexual misconduct where sexual
misconduct is alleged."
E. Self-insured Retentions
As intimated earlier, policy language and courts' interpretations con-
cerning self-insured retentions can also significantly affect a diocese's in-
surance coverage. If possible, a diocese should negotiate policy language
limiting the number of self-insured retentions applicable to third party
claims spanning multiple coverage years. If not possible, a diocese may
consider augmenting its aggregate coverage, if available, lowering its self-
insured retention, or obtaining separate first-dollar coverage for miscon-
duct.
F. Notice Provisions
A diocese should also be aware of any policy notice provisions.
Whether or not a diocese gives its insurer proper notice of a claim may
determine whether the diocese is entitled to any recovery at all. A diocese
may try to negotiate policy language which clearly defines when the dio-
cese is charged with sufficient knowledge of a potential claim to trigger its
notice obligations. Special attention should be paid if language such as
"immediately" or " as a condition precedent" are included in the notice
provisions as opposed to "as soon as practical" or "when it becomes rea-
sonably likely."
G. Control of the Defenses
A provision concerning the control of the defense is also beneficial.
A diocese should try to retain the power to select defense counsel and to
control the defense and settlement of claims, rather than completely relin-
quishing such rights to its insurer.
"9 See discussion supra Part III.A. I .c.
90 See discussion supra Part III.D.
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H. Claims-made Coverage
Finally, whether the policy being considered for purchase is an occur-
rence based policy or a claims-made policy can determine the issues to
which the diocese should be alerted. Specifically, when obtaining a claims
made policy, special attention should be paid to policy provisions relating
to the retroactive date and the extended reporting option. Proper language
can avoid future gaps in coverage.
Though not an exhaustive list, these are many of the issues with
which a diocese should be concerned when shopping for insurance. But a
diocese should also be aware that some of the suggestions noted may in-
crease the cost of coverage. Others may simply not be available under cur-
rent market conditions. A diocese may test the market by sponsoring
competitive bids between brokers. Such competition typically maximizes
a diocese's market exposure, thus yielding substantial premium savings.
Although a diocese should be aware of the process I have just de-
scribed in order to make an informed decision to provide for its insurance
needs, alternatives to this process do exist.
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO COMMERCIAL MARKET INSURANCE
Indeed, several religious organizations have found it advantageous to
avoid the commercial market altogether and obtain coverage for clergy
misconduct by making their own insurance arrangements. Such arrange-
ments can take three forms, that of a risk retention group, a captive or a
charitable risk pool.
A. Risk Retention Groups
The first alternative is a risk retention group." Under the 1986 revi-
sions to the Federal Liability Risk Retention Act,92 associations of entities
engaged in similar activities may form insurance companies to cover risks
arising from those activities. Under the Act, if the risk retention group is
licensed in one state, federal law preempts any other state from requiring
that the risk retention group be licensed. Most risk retention groups are
domiciled in Vermont which is sympathetic to the needs of risk retention
groups and imposes fewer capital surplus and investment requirements
upon them. Thus, several dioceses could join together (as other organiza-
tions have) to form Vermont domiciled risk retention groups.
91 See JoAnn M. Strasser & James T. O'Reilly, Clergy Misconduct: Confronting the Diffi-
cult Constitutional and Institutional Liability Issues, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 31, 70 (1994).
92 15 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3906 (West 1997).
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B. Captives
Another alternative is to organize a captive, which is a concept very
similar to a risk retention group.93 Usually these are domiciled off-shore,
chiefly in Bermuda or the Caymans.94 The financial regulations and the
tax laws in these jurisdictions are less stringent than in virtually all of the
United States.95 Recent amendments to the Internal Revenue Code, how-
ever, make it less advantageous for associations of non-profit organiza-
tions to form off-shore captives. It is now easier for the IRS to claim that
funds generated by these arrangements are subject to the Unrelated Busi-
ness Income Tax (" UBIT"). Certain advantages remain if a single non-
profit organization forms an off-shore captive. It is also common for
United States domiciled captives or risk retention groups to cede reinsur-
ance risks to related off-shore captives. Reinsuring off-shore yields the
following advantage: the federal excise tax on direct insurance premiums
is 4%, whereas the federal excise tax for reinsurance premiums is only
1%.96 In recent years, Vermont has grown to have nearly as many captives
as Bermuda, and also offers some financial and regulatory benefits.
C. Charitable Risk Pools
Finally, a diocese may consider a charitable risk pool as an alternative
to the commercial market. The Internal Revenue Code, again, provides
advantageous treatment for charitable pooling arrangements. To benefit
from this advantageous treatment, however, the risk pool must be estab-
lished and licensed by a state and not all states allow such organizations.
A diocese will need to consider all of these suggestions to know
which type of insurance coverage is right for its situation. But I believe a
diocese will find that the time it invests in this process is time well spent.
Being fully informed when purchasing insurance or entering into an alter-
native insurance arrangement will only benefit the diocese when it comes
time to deal with a specific claim.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion suggests practical measures a diocese (or,
where applicable, a diocesan attorney) should consider to foster a more
advantageous position and restore harmony to its relation with its insurer.
These practical measures are rooted in the day to day relations between
93 See James A. Christopherson, The Captive Medical Malpractice Insurance Company
Alternative, 5 ANNALS HEALTH L. 121 (1996).
94 See id. at 133.
" See id. at 131.
9 See 26 U.S.C. § 4371(3) (West 1997).
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dioceses and the insurers:
1. The person purchasing insurance may benefit from the advice of a
knowledgeable lawyer or other consultant in the purchasing and shaping
the diocese's insurance plan. The better you understand what you are
buying, the easier it will be to comply with insurers' requirements and the
more you will be able to maximize the benefits you derive. Critically,
neither the diocese nor the diocesan attorney should rely on or defer to
anyone the responsibility of understanding the insurance plan and all its
ramifications. The devil is in the details and knowledge of the details is
central to achieving acceptable results.
2. The person purchasing insurance may wish to consider joining with
other dioceses in the province, in the region, or elsewhere and pool insur-
ance programs. There are a number of ways for doing this as well as ex-
amples of what can be done. The key is that someone has to take the ini-
tiative and begin the conversation.
3. Carefully comply with the requirements of your insurance plan.
This usually means giving prompt written notice of incidents which are
likely to result in claims and keep the insurer fully informed about the pro-
gress of the matter.
4. Meticulously keep a record of your communications with your in-
surer. This begins with your first notice to the insurer and should continue
through the time the matter is closed. Depending on your circumstances,
you may want to keep a separate file on your communications with the in-
surer for each case. This will enable you to see more readily what you
have communicated to the insurer and remedy any deficiencies before they
become an issue.
5. You may wish to supplement your written reports to the insurer
with periodic meetings to make sure that files and facts do not fall between
the cracks.
6. Whatever you do, be mindful of the possibility that you may end
up in litigation with the insurer. Also, remember that good communication
with an insurer is more likely to produce a good result than poor commu-
nication; and a good result obviates the need for litigation. Critically, as
with other disagreements, there are more alternatives to be evaluated than
just litigation. A diocesan insurance position that may have weaknesses
may be more useful for negotiating a tolerable settlement with an insurer
than forming the basis for litigation that the diocese has an articulable ba-
sis for losing. In other words, here as elsewhere, better a half a loaf and no
legal precedent than no loaf at all and a bad legal precedent.
In the end, there is nothing magical about insurance and nothing
mystical about dealing with insurers effectively. They are key players on
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the liability field. In the best situations, they are on the diocesan team and
function as team members. In the worst situations, they may assume a dif-
ficult posture, and the diocese may have to resort to its legal alternatives.
As with other things, most relationships fall somewhere in between. This
means that dioceses and diocesan attorneys must engage in an often tedi-
ous day in and day out effort to promote good relations in the hope of in-
spiring a cooperative response.
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